

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

1 March 2018  
Mr. Joseph Lloyd  
MuckRock News  
DEPT MR 48580  
411A Highland Avenue  
Somerville, MA 02144-2516

Reference: F-2018-00882

Dear Mr. Lloyd:

This is a final response to your 10 February 2018 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request, received in the office of the Information and Privacy Coordinator on 12 February 2018, for information on **Yuri Alekseyevich Gagarin**. We assigned your request the reference number above. Please use this number when corresponding with us so that we can identify it easily. We processed your request in accordance with the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552, as amended, and the CIA Information Act, 50 U.S.C. § 3141, as amended. We conducted a search for records that would reveal an openly acknowledged affiliation and located 12 previously released documents, consisting of 28 pages, which were released as part of another release program. Copies of the documents are enclosed

In accordance with Section 3.6(a) of Executive Order 13526, the CIA can neither confirm nor deny the existence or nonexistence of records responsive to your request. The fact of the existence or nonexistence of such records is itself currently and properly classified and is intelligence sources and methods information protected from disclosure by Section 6 of the CIA Act of 1949, as amended, and Section 102A(i)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended. Therefore, your request is denied pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3). I have enclosed an explanation of these exemptions for your reference and retention. As the CIA Information and Privacy Coordinator, I am the CIA official responsible for this determination. You have the right to appeal this response to the Agency Release Panel, in my care, within 90 days from the date of this letter. Please include the basis of your appeal.

If you have any questions regarding our response, you may contact us at:

Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, DC 20505  
Information and Privacy Coordinator  
703-613-3007 (Fax)

Please be advised that you may seek dispute resolution services from the CIA's FOIA Public Liaison or from the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS) of the National Archives and Records Administration. OGIS offers mediation services to help resolve disputes between FOIA requesters and Federal agencies. You may reach CIA's FOIA Public Liaison at:

703-613-1287 (FOIA Hotline)

The contact information for OGIS is:

Office of Government Information Services  
National Archives and Records Administration  
8601 Adelphi Road – OGIS  
College Park, MD 20740-6001  
202-741-5770  
877-864-6448  
202-741-5769 (fax)  
[ogis@nara.gov](mailto:ogis@nara.gov)

Contacting the CIA's FOIA Public Liaison or OGIS does not affect your right to pursue an administrative appeal.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Allison Fong', with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

Allison Fong  
Information and Privacy Coordinator

Enclosures

## Explanation of Exemptions

### Freedom of Information Act:

- (b)(1) exempts from disclosure information currently and properly classified, pursuant to an Executive Order;
- (b)(2) exempts from disclosure information which pertains solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of the Agency;
- (b)(3) exempts from disclosure information that another federal statute protects, provided that the other federal statute either requires that the matters be withheld, or establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld. The (b)(3) statutes upon which the CIA relies include, but are not limited to, the CIA Act of 1949;
- (b)(4) exempts from disclosure trade secrets and commercial or financial information that is obtained from a person and that is privileged or confidential;
- (b)(5) exempts from disclosure inter- and intra-agency memoranda or letters that would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency;
- (b)(6) exempts from disclosure information from personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy;
- (b)(7) exempts from disclosure information compiled for law enforcement purposes to the extent that the production of the information (A) could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings; (B) would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication; (C) could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; (D) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source or, in the case of information compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, information furnished by a confidential source; (E) would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law; or (F) could reasonably be expected to endanger any individual's life or physical safety;
- (b)(8) exempts from disclosure information contained in reports or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, or on behalf of, or for use of an agency responsible for regulating or supervising financial institutions; and
- (b)(9) exempts from disclosure geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells.

April 2012

Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R00890A001300010025-5

NSC BRIEFING

DOCUMENT NO.   
 NO CHANGE IN CLASS.   
 CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C   
 AUTH: 11170-2   
 DATE: 1-31-80   
 REVIEWER: 372044

20 October 1960

## SOVIET SPACE PROGRAM PROPAGANDA

- I. Review of Soviet propaganda statements on manned space flights, in light of movement of Sibir instrumentation ships and other indications, indicates propagandists went out on a limb.
- A. Propaganda emphasis on Soviet program to place man in space built up gradually from May 1960 until late August when marked step-up noted.
- B. Soviet statements after Sputnik V success reflected increased confidence and by late September tended to omit references to further tests prior to initial effort with man.
- C. Specific attention drawn to imminence of space effort about time Sibir class ships reached stations in Pacific (mid-September). Period ships on station coincided closely with Khrushchev's stay in New York.
- D. Specific statements:
1. 16 September--Moscow announced "World Day" to be observed 27 September.
  2. 26 September--Soviets said "Science will mark another splendid event in the next few days." "Mankind stands on the threshold of first trip of an interplanetary ship with a crew of people."
  3. 26 September--Moscow announced, according to unconfirmed (From Radio Moscow to Arctic stations):   
 25X1D [REDACTED] radio broadcast / "Soviet scientists will attempt to bring back to earth a cosmic ship..."

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4. 28 September--Soviets revealed existence of astronaut training program in USSR and stated "manned flight is not far off."
5. 1 October--Prague Radio announced: "An astronaut will be launched in a few days time into orbit."

II. Statements after 1 October indicate Soviet propaganda retreated.

- A. Diverted attention from imminent operation.
- B. Resumed discussion of safety precautions.
- C. Re-introduced comment on Soviet probes to Moon, Mars and Venus.

URGENT

MOSCOW COSMONAUT KILLED ~~ALL 3 COSMONAUTS~~ MOSCOW TELEVISION AND RADIO IN A SIMULTANEOUS BROADCAST SAID THE COSMONAUT WAS KILLED DURING LANDING OF THE SPACECRAFT. THEY SAID ROPES OF THE PARACHUTE MEANT TO SOFTEN THE LANDING TWISTED AND IT HIT WITH GREAT FORCE.

THE DEATH OF KOMAROV RECALLED THE APOLLO SPACE CAPSULE FIRE AGROUND THAT KILLED THREE U.S. ASTRONAUTS AT CAPE KENNEDY JAN. 27. AND DELAYED THE AMERICAN PROGRAM OF PLACING A MAN ON THE MOON. IT WAS A MATTER OF SPECULATION WHETHER THE SOVIET ACCIDENT WOULD SIMILARLY DELAY RUSSIAN PLANS.

P937 AES

*pg. 2*

FBIS 35 (SEE 33)

MOSCOW TASS INTERNATIONAL SERVICE IN ENGLISH 1439Z 24 APR 67 L

(TEXT) THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE, THE PRESIDUM OF THE USSR SUPREME SOVIET, AND THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS HAVE ANNOUNCED WITH GREAT SORROW THAT COLONEL-ENGINEER VLADIMIR KOMAROV, ONE OF THE FIRST SPACE EXPLORERS AND TALENTED TESTER OF SPACESHIPS, MEMBER OF THE CPSU, FLIER-COSMONAUT, AND HERO OF THE SOVIET UNION, PERISHED TRAGICALLY WHILE COMPLETING THE TEST FLIGHT OF SPACESHIP SOYUZ 1 TODAY. THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE, THE PRESIDUM OF THE USSR SUPREME SOVIET, AND THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS HAVE EXPRESSED DEEP CONDOLENCES TO THE FAMILY OF THE DECEASED.

24 APR 1451Z JD/HM

FOIAb3b

Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP75-00149R000400100001-9

Soviet Cosmonaut Deaths  
EXTENSION OF REMARKS  
OF  
HON. CRAIG HOSMER  
OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
Monday, October 9, 1967

✓ Mr. HOSMER. Mr. Speaker, Julius Epstein is a research associate at the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace. He was educated at the Universities of Jena and Leipzig and has been a foreign correspondent. In the following article, which appeared in the Los Angeles Times of October 4 he asks that the United States give an honest accounting of what it knows about Soviet space losses, so that tragedies in the U.S. program can be assessed with proper perspective. I second Epstein's request.

TOPICAL COMMENT: SOVIET SPACE LOSSES—  
U.S. PUBLIC NOT PROPERLY INFORMED  
(By Julius Epstein)

News on failures of Soviet manned space flights is, at least in part, "managed" by Washington. No American without access to the relevant classified information can know for sure whether the Soviets suffered fatalities in space. But the evidence is clear that Washington would not tell even if it knew all about Soviet space accidents.

Rumors that Soviet cosmonauts were lost have been circulating for years—long before Vladimir M. Komarov was killed last April, in the only fatal accident admitted by Moscow. For example, on Oct. 4, 1965, Electronic News reported "the Russians have lost 10 cosmonauts, including one woman, in faulty space shots." This information was attributed to "a top NASA official."

In the same year, the celebrated "Penkovsky Papers" were published. Col. Oleg Penkovsky was a high official in Soviet intelligence. President Kennedy considered him to be our best informer inside the U.S.S.R. During the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, Mr. Kennedy relied on Col. Penkovsky's information about Soviet missile preparedness. Penkovsky was caught and executed.

The Penkovsky book contains two references to Soviet space fatalities. "Several sputniks were launched . . . and never

heard from again. They took the lives of several trained astronauts." The colonel also asserted: "There were several unsuccessful launchings of sputniks, with men killed prior to Gagarin's flight. Either the missile would explode on the launching pad or it would go up and never return." Since Penkovsky's information on Soviet casualties proved to be accurate, there seems to be no reason to dispute his other disclosures. The Central Intelligence Agency allowed the publication of the Penkovsky materials.

In hearings before the foreign operations and government information subcommittee on May 23 and June 6, 1963, witnesses from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), hinted broadly that the Soviets had suffered various mishaps in space. But, on the ground that the information is classified, they shied away from full disclosure.

Some Soviet mishaps even became known to the free world through Communist sources. A few years ago, a high official of a Czech-Soviet space research center in Prague leaked to an Italian news agency the story that several Soviet cosmonauts had died in space.

Even more authentic was the front-page story in the London Daily Worker on April 12, 1961. The headlines read: "Soviet Cosmonaut Circles Earth Three Times" . . . "First Man in Space Back Alive—But Suffering from Effects of His Flight."

The story, according to which the Soviet cosmonaut was launched on April 7, 1961, was wired to the Daily Worker by its Moscow correspondent, Dennis Ogden.

He and other Communist correspondents had received sealed envelopes which contained the sensational story. The envelopes were not supposed to be opened without the permission of the Soviet government. All the Communist newsmen except Ogden followed the order.

Since the launching actually was a failure, the Kremlin never released the story—and only Ogden sent a dispatch anyway.

According to reliable information, the CIA submitted a confidential document to the White House early this year reporting the deaths of at least 11 cosmonauts in addition to that of Komarov.

The Washington decision not to disclose information on Soviet manned space flight failures was made during the last days of the Eisenhower Administration, presumably to protect intelligence sources. This decision is laid down in an agreement between the Department of Defense and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, dated January 13, 1961.

At present, Washington's silence appears to be motivated by the strong desire to hear no evil, see no evil and speak no evil about the U.S.S.R.

According to the 1961 agreement, NASA publishes information on Soviet space activities which has "been authorized for public release through the office of the assistant secretary of defense for public affairs," provided "the data on foreign space activities" have been "officially reported to the United Nations Registry." In addition, only those data can be released which were confirmed by the U.S. space surveillance system run by the North American Air Defense Command.

However, only those confirmed "data on foreign space activities (including failures)" can be released by NASA "which have been publicly announced by the foreign government concerned."

With the one exception of the Komarov catastrophe, which could not be concealed, the Soviets have never yet announced any of their manned space flight failures. Hence, the agreement of Jan. 13, 1961, has probably resulted in the withholding of such information from the American public.

FOIAb3b

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Approved For Release 2004/02/03 : CIA-RDP64B00346R000200030017-3

5 FEB 1962

STAT

MEMORANDUM FOR:

[REDACTED]  
Assistant Legislative Counsel

FROM:

Deputy Assistant Director/Production/SI

SUBJECT:

Galley Proofs of Library of Congress Study  
of The Soviet Space Program

The galley proofs prepared by the Library of Congress on  
the Soviet Space Programs: Organization, Plans, Goals, and  
International Implications, dated 12 January 1962 have been reviewed  
in the Office of Scientific Intelligence and <sup>are</sup> ~~is~~ free of sensitive material.

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OSI/SD/CWM:lbg (1 Feb 62)

Distribution:

Orig-1 fwd

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Approved For Release 2004/02/03 : CIA-RDP64B00346R000200030017-3



FEB 1962


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Assistant Legislative Counsel

FROM: Deputy Assistant Director/Production/SI

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OSI/SD/CWM:lbg (1 Feb 62)

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2 O/AD/SI  
2 SD/SI

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TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE
TO: Office General Counsel		
ROOM NO. 226	BUILDING East	
REMARKS:		
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<div style="text-align: right;"><i>JSW</i> <i>JGO</i> <i>STE</i></div> <div style="text-align: center; margin-top: 20px;"><i>Senate Space File</i></div>		
FROM: DAD/P/SI		
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FORM NO. 241  
1 FEB 55REPLACES FORM 36-8  
WHICH MAY BE USED.

\* GPO : 1957 - O - 439445

STAT

HE SAW 'FIREFLIES,' TOO

## Cool Cosmonaut Titov Lets No Space Secrets Slip

By WILLIAM HINES  
Star Science Writer

If U-2 Pilot Francis Gary Powers didn't tell the Russians why more about the spy business than Cosmonaut Gherman Titov told yesterday about the space business, the Central Intelligence Agency has nothing to worry about.

Maj. Titov, holder of the world's record for time in orbit, met the press for an hour at the Soviet Embassy yesterday. He easily, even off-handedly, lived up to Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin's prediction that "he will be able to withstand your most loaded questions."

The consensus was that if the short, wiry, 27-year-old pilot is the archetype of the New Soviet Man, then the N.S.M. is a very cool cookie, indeed. Only once did Maj. Titov lose his composure, and that was when he spotted a photographer lying prone on the floor, intent on getting a picture with just that certain angle.

He broke up. Otherwise he was imperturbable, fielding all questions with aplomb, answering (and not-answering) just as much as his conscience and the party-line prescribed, and getting in a few healthy propaganda licks for such Soviet pet projects as disarmament.

More than 150 news repre-

sentatives jammed a second-floor parlor to trade question-and-answer thrusts with the Soviet spaceman.

Comparisons between spacemen of the Soviet and American varieties were inevitable. Political orientation aside, it was obvious that a cosmic pilot of whatever nationality was likely to be a quick thinker. Like Lt. Col. John H. Glenn, Maj. Titov proved to be a man of ready wit.

A reporter asked whether the next Russian in orbit would be a small man like the 5-foot-4 cosmonaut. He responded with a grin that obviously a five-ton spaceship can carry a big man, and that small ones are chosen because people like to have their pictures taken with cosmonauts.

If a cosmonaut were the size of Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin (a six-footer), Maj. Titov explained, people behind him wouldn't be able to be seen in the picture.

Another reporter quizzed him about the "cosmic fireflies" which Col. Glenn reported seeing February 20 and which Maj. Titov said yesterday he, too, had seen. The reporter recalled that a space agency study had laid the firefly phenomenon to bits of paint flaking off the Friendship-7 cap-



GHERMAN TITOV  
— AP Photo

sule, a theory Col. Glenn disputes.

Maj. Titov replied thoughtfully that he believed the snow-like flecks were created by rocket fuel. Then, with a twinkle in his blue eyes, he added:

"From my ship Vostok-2, I'm quite sure the paint was not peeling."

He was asked if he thought

the day would come when Soviet and American spacemen would share the same capsule on a trip to the moon. He found in this question a propaganda opening big enough to drive a Stalin tank through.

"I don't know whether they will fly to the moon or further, but I'm sure they'll fly," he replied. "And as far as the time is concerned, I'll tell you it will be sooner if our countries come to an agreement to prohibit war — to disarm."

"Then our countries will have the opportunity to send men into space. . . . The pilot may be the representative of one country."

"The Soviet Union," Ambassador Dobrynin, seated at Maj. Titov's side, interjected.

Maj. Titov's non-answers to technical questions were conceded to be masterpieces. A few were brushed aside with the phrase, "It is of no importance." But most were accorded thoughtful, courteous, detailed non-answers. The fact that communication was filtered through an interpreter with a less-than-perfect command of English apparently helped, too.

He sidestepped questions about the seasickness reported one-third of the way through his 25-hour flight last August 6-7. "The person who told you

about it apparently flew with me," he said sarcastically. "It was in bad taste. My condition was not bad."

He avoided discussions of cosmonaut training and the numbers of men involved. "Before the flight of Gagarin we had more than a million applications for flight," he said. "But now the number of applications has been decreased because people have seen that the training is very hard. Anyway, I think it is of no importance. For the next flight the cosmonaut is ready."

Other substantive questions received similar treatment. And always Maj. Titov returned to the main theme: disarm first, co-operate in space later.

Would he go to Cape Canaveral, or had he asked to go?

"I think we have not yet reached the level of conditions that will allow us to see military rockets. We must have disarmament."

An hour and two minutes after the conference began, Ambassador Dobrynin ended it with the promise that Maj. Titov will meet the press again (the next time this evening at the National Academy of Sciences). The TV lights went out, the crowd of newsmen milled around, and Maj. Titov left the conference room with neither a hair nor a space-secret out of place.

# 11 Cosmonauts Die in Space

By ROBERT S. ALLEN  
and PAUL SCOTT



Mr. Allen

WASHINGTON — Space and missile accidents in Russia are causing far more deaths than those in the U.S.

On the basis of latest U.S. Intelligence data, the Soviet has lost at least 11 cosmonauts since its first space flight in 1960, which was unsuccessful. This has never been publicly admitted, although all the pertinent facts are known to U.S. authorities.

Significantly, five of the Russian cosmonauts were killed when their spacecrafts failed to go into orbit after reaching heights of several hundred miles.

No U.S. astronaut has been lost in flight. The only deaths have been in accidents on the ground and in plane crashes not connected with the space program.

The six other Soviet cosmonauts lost their lives in a series of mishaps ranging from missiles exploding during countdowns to training incidents involving helicopter crashes.

These and other details of the Russian fatalities are highlighted in a Central Intelligence Agency report prepared for the White House several weeks before the Cape Kennedy disaster that took the lives of astronauts Virgil Grissom, Edward White and Robert Chaffee.

The CIA study reveals that the U.S. has radio intercepts of the frantic efforts of Soviet ground controllers to contact their cosmonauts after their spacecraft failed to orbit.

These voice recordings, as

lieve this costly accident may be one reason the Russians are now blaming the death of three U.S. astronauts on pressure to rush the space program.

Kremlin pressure on Soviet scientists to develop the first nuclear-powered missile is cited in the CIA report as one of the probable causes of the Russian tragedy.

As related by the CIA, many of the Soviet's leading scientists were working under Marshal Nedelin in a furious crash program to develop a nuclear missile before the 43rd anniversary of the October revolution. Khrushchev, then Premier, wanted to announce a successful launching during the celebration, and ordered that no effort be spared to achieve it.

When the missile was tested, it failed to leave the launching pad. After a period had elapsed, Nedelin and the scientists left the safety of the blockhouse to examine the missile. Suddenly, there was a titanic explosion, killing everyone in the vicinity.

The CIA report also tells of other cases where missiles being tested in Russia have gone off course and hit inhabited areas.

While it has been U.S. policy not to make official announcements regarding fatal Soviet space accidents, the Cape Kennedy tragedy may change this.

Under discussion by an inner Administration Intelligence committee is a proposal to provide the House and Senate Space Committees with publishable CIA findings of such Rus-

~~SECRET~~

7 September 1967


## MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: New York Times Article on "Unusual" Soviet Space Launches

1. The Clark article is essentially correct in the details of the "unusual" sequence of Soviet space launches; however, there was an additional launch on 22 March 1967 which failed to reach orbit, making a total of eight flight tests to date.

2. The TIMES article implies that the Soviets are testing a weapon system which will be stored in space and deorbited on command in the event of war. We believe that they are testing concepts related to a weapon system that would be stored on the ground until the order to attack is given, and would be brought down on target during the initial orbit. The launch vehicle as presently configured does not have sufficient energy to attack the United States on the initial orbit, therefore, we believe modifications requiring additional flight testing will be necessary.

25X1

~~SECRET~~

**SECRET**

31 AUG 1967

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: New York Times Article on "Unusual" Soviet  
Space Launches

1. Although this article appeared in the open press, unclassified, our confirmation of the information involves intelligence sources and must be classified Secret. The article is essentially correct in the details of the "unusual" Soviet space launches; however, there was an additional launch on 22 March 1967 which failed to reach orbit, making a total of 8 flight tests to date.

2. The Times article implies that the Soviets are testing a weapon system which will be stored in space and deorbited on command in the event of war. We believe that they are testing concepts related to a weapon system that would be stored on the ground until the order to attack is given, and would be brought down on target during the initial orbit. This judgment is based on the nature of the flight tests; the limitations of the vehicle involved; the lack of a suitable command and control network for a space stored system; and a technical assessment of the advantages and disadvantages of the two strategic concepts.


25X1

4. The launch vehicle as presently configured does not have sufficient energy to attack the U.S. on the initial orbit, therefore, we believe modifications requiring additional flight testing will be necessary. This weapon system is not expected to become operational before late 1968 or 1969.

25X1

DAVID S. BRANDWEIN  
Director

Foreign Missile and Space Analysis Center

**SECRET**

**SECRET**OXC 2431  
Copy 4 of 4

11 October 1961

**MEMORANDUM FOR:** Assistant Chief, DPD**SUBJECT:** Restricted Air Space**REFERENCE:** 

25X1A

1. Referenced message indicates the trend we can expect in restricted areas of vital interest to the OXCART program. As the other commands become more familiar with the lifting of restrictions they will develop tactics in their training programs which rely on operations within restricted areas.

2. While no sensitive testing is scheduled during this particular period continued use  will seriously hamper the OXCART program.

25X1A

25X1A

25X1A

**SIGNED**  
Chief, Special Projects Branch, DPD**cc: AC/DPD****Distribution:**

- #1 - Addee
- #2 - AC/DPD
- #3 - DPD/SPB
- #4 - DPD/RI

**SECRET**

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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

30 October 1961

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: Release of Selected National Intelligence Estimates to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)

1. With the approval of USIB a number of NIE's have been released to NASA dealing with guided missiles, space vehicles, atomic energy, and overall Soviet military and scientific policies and capabilities.

2. The Board of National Estimates recommends that USIB approve the release of the Secret and Top Secret versions or sections of the following additional estimates to the Director of NASA:

NIE 11-3-61: SINO-SOVIET AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITIES  
THROUGH MID-1966

NIE 11-8-61: SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR LONG RANGE ATTACK

NIE 11-8/1-61: STRENGTH AND DEPLOYMENT OF SOVIET LONG  
RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILE FORCES

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NIE 11-4-61: MAIN TRENDS IN SOVIET CAPABILITIES  
(Military Annexes) AND POLICIES 1961-1966

SNIE 11-11-61: IMPLICATIONS OF THE SOVIET RESUMPTION  
OF NUCLEAR TESTING

25X6

NIE 11-2-61: THE SOVIET ATOMIC ENERGY PROGRAM

3. This matter will be placed on the agenda of an early  
USIB meeting.

25X1A

CHESTER L. COOPER  
Deputy Assistant Director  
National Estimates

DISTRIBUTION A

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Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP82R00129R000100110023-3

12 September 1961

25X1A

Memorandum For [ ]

Subject: Release of Estimates to NASA

1. At Mr. Cooper's direction, I note for possible action estimates which might be released to NASA.

2. For your guidance I have attached a memorandum to the USIB of 7 October 1960 which lists thirteen estimates which were released at that time. In the present calendar year USIB has released, upon our recommendation, the following:

In February:

NIE 11-4-60, "Main Trends in Soviet Capabilities and Policies, 1960-1965"

NIE 13-60, "Communist China"

In June:

NIE 11-5-61, "Soviet Technical Capabilities in Guided Missiles and Space Vehicles" (including Annexes A-F)

3. The following estimates, which Mr. Cooper and I selected as candidates for release, were not approved by the BNE:

NIE 13-2-60, "Chinese Communist Atomic Energy Program" (Summary and Conclusions)

NIE 4-61, "Consequences of US Resumption of Nuclear Testing"

25X1A

4. In mid-July we recommended to the BNE ([ ] was Acting DAD) the release of NIE's 11-3-60, "Sino-Soviet Air Defense Capabilities Through Mid-1966" and 11-8-61, "Soviet Capabilities for Long Range Attack." The corresponding 1960 estimates had been released. This matter was discussed very briefly by the

Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP82R00129R000100110023-3

SECRET

**BNE** several times but, to my knowledge, no recommendation was taken to the USIB. I believe the last time the Board discussed it Mr. Kent was going to look into the security aspects of the release, especially of 11-8. Possibly negative action has been taken on these items, but, if so, it has not come to my attention.

5. I note that the Military Annexes of NIE 11-4-61 were approved by USIB on 24 August. The corresponding annexes of the 1960 paper were released to NASA. You will wish to consider whether SNIE 11-11-61, "Implications of the Soviet Resumption of Nuclear Testing" should be recommended for release. Last year two estimates on nuclear testing were released (SNIE's 11-9 and 11-9A).

6. To complete the record, [ ] did not feel that the following needed to be recommended for release:

25X1A

NIE 11-61, "Probable Intelligence Warning of Soviet Attack on the US"

SNIE 11-9-61, "The Possibility of Soviet Nuclear Testing During the Moratorium"

25X6

7. In summary, final action should be taken on NIE's 11-3-61 and 11-8-61, and it should be determined whether or not the NIE 11-4-61 Annexes and SNIE 11-11-61 should be recommended for release.

25X1A

[ ]  
Special Assistant for Planning

Copy: Executive Secretary, USIB  
(without attachment)

Attachment

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DCI BRIEFING

APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: 16-Jan-2013

16 May 1961

## SOVIET SPACE

## I. Soviet Goal

A. In 1955 the Interagency Committee for Interplanetary Communications (ICIC) announced that "interplanetary travel" was the goal of the space program of the USSR.

B. Intelligence available, [ ]  
[ ] confirms that this was--and is--a true statement.

## II. Build-up

A. As early as 1950, the decision was apparently made that the exploration of space deserved serious consideration, as it was in this year that an extensive program of vertical rocket firings began for the collection of geophysical and bio-medical information.

B. This program involved a considerable number of firings and set the stage for the 1955 announcement.

C. Because of greater load carrying capability available to Soviets--since 1959 they have been able to put approximately five tons in orbit--they were able to conduct a considerable number of experiments simultaneously and thus needed fewer flights than are required for the US program.

D. The entire Soviet program relies on the basic ICBM booster of 750,000 pounds <sup>thrust</sup>, with two other upper stages which are used according to need.

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16 May 1961

E. We feel that they have been able to accomplish an impressive space program with only a few types of engines.

### III. The importance of "Firsts"

A. Steady technological progress has been made and the program has also been neatly tailored so that important "firsts" could be achieved. On many occasions timing could be made to coincide with international political events.

1. They have by-passed many basic scientific firsts which have been garnered by the United States, in order to achieve those which could best be exploited by propaganda.

B. It is apparent that from the very beginning the Soviets recognized the propaganda and prestige value in achieving leadership in this field. We believe, however, that while the Soviets had some awareness that space events would have some importance in the eyes of the world, even they somewhat underrated the world impact.

1. It was not until the launching of Sputnik I in October 1957 that the Soviets fully realized the importance of achieving spectacular "firsts".

### IV. Earth Orbit of Man

A. The Soviets began their actual biological experiments early in the space program in vertical shots about 1950. They began prolonged biological experiments with orbiting of a dog in their Sputnik II in November 1957.

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16 May 1961

- B. We believe, however, that the first of a series of capsules large enough to hold a man and designed to be recovered was Sputnik IV, launched in May 1960.
- C. Although the Soviet experience had been far from 100 percent successful, the launchings and recoveries of two vehicles in March 1961 apparently gave them the confidence necessary to attempt the manned shot on 12 April 1961.
- D. The launching took place at 0607 GMT on 12 April.
- E. 50 minutes later, while Gagarin was still in orbit, TASS announced to the world that a Soviet man was in earth orbit.
- F. US collection stations confirmed the launching of Sputnik XI  
[redacted] we have confirmed to our satisfaction that there was indeed a man in this vehicle.
- G. [redacted]  
[redacted]
- H. [redacted]
- I. Propaganda for several days preceding the launching was designed to focus world attention on this event.
- J. Conflicting statements were in most cases the result of various Soviets releasing information each in accordance with his own interpretation of security requirements.

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3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs[redacted]  
Copy 3 of 4 Thms # 1  
12 April 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Comments on the Soviet Man-in-Space event

1. This memorandum furnished for information only per your request.
2. The successful Soviet man-in-space effort of 12 April appears to have been marked by remarkable Soviet efforts to assure maximum worldwide public attention to the event. The steady stream of rumors from Moscow sources, reported by press and radio correspondents, beginning on the morning of 10 April all seem in retrospect to have been part of a carefully planned effort by Moscow to rivet public attention to the event which finally occurred last night.
3. The Soviet man-in-space effort seems to have been marked also by a high degree of confidence that the operation would be successful, particularly after the launching phase was completed. Moscow radio declared last night at 10:00 PM (EST) [redacted] that an official announcement would be made concerning the man-in-space press reports at 2:00 AM (EST). At 2:03 AM, Moscow Radio announced the launching [redacted], and followed with unusual running

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commentaries on the astronaut's condition until he landed at about 3:00 AM.

4. The 10:00 PM announcement had been worded in such a way as to permit the Russians to officially debunk the earlier press reports if the initial phases of the man-in-space operation turned out to be unsuccessful. On balance, however, we believe the Soviet performance reflected a high degree of Soviet assurance that the effort would prove successful.

5. The 10 April rumors emanating from Moscow grew out of the appearance of a crew of Soviet television cameramen at the Central Telegraph office in Moscow near mid-day, Moscow time. They were there, [redacted] "to film reaction of the foreign correspondents" to an announcement which the Soviet television men had apparently expected about that time. When queried about the reason for his presence, one of the Russian technicians said "man", and gestured skyward. However, there was no official announcement, and after more than an hour's wait and some checking by telephone, the television crew departed. From then on, through the day, virtually all Western correspondents in Moscow, reported rumors that the Russians had put a man-in-space. The correspondents quoted various sources -- taxi drivers and Soviet journalists.

6. The apparent Soviet publicity effort continued through 11 April. At a luncheon that day with a French official in Paris, a diplomat claimed

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it was a fact that a Soviet astronaut was in space. Of greater impact was a story breaking in the London Daily Worker at about the same time. The Daily Worker's correspondent in Moscow reported that a Soviet astronaut had been launched last Friday, had orbited the earth three times and had been recovered. According to this story, the astronaut was physically fit, but had suffered emotional after-effects.

7. This was not the first time that Moscow had used the London Daily Worker to plant unofficial news items for larger purposes.

8. The Soviet propaganda campaign initially sowed some confusion in the intelligence community. Available data


provided no indication of a Soviet space event. But

the Russians had unsuccessfully fired an ICBM from Tyura Tam.

9. In the light of the press rumors from Moscow, we considered carefully the possibility that the ICBM firing may, in fact, have been related to a man-in-space operation.

10. This possibility was quickly discarded for a number of reasons.

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(Recent Soviet ICBM shots have been characterized by an unusually high number of failures.)

11. In sum, then, we conclude that there was no substance to the various rumors concerning a man-in-space emanating from Communist sources on 10 and 11 April; that these rumors were part of a carefully prepared Soviet effort to rivet the world's attention to this morning's event; and that the entire operation was apparently marked by Moscow's confidence that the astronaut's flight would be successful.

HERBERT SCOVILLE, JR.  
Assistant Director  
Scientific Intelligence

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*White House  
file*



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